by the Arbitration Association
RU

The Sapin 2 law: France’s new vessel in the treacherous waters of enforcement immunity

April 4, 2019

The French law No. 2016-1691 on transparency, anti-corruption and the modernisation of the economic life (hereafter “the Sapin 2 law”)[1]was primarily aimed at reforming French anti-corruption laws. Some important alterations relating to measures of constraint available over State assets were included in the raft of reforms. This article looks at State immunity, measures of constraint under the old regime, and the changes brought under the Sapin 2 law.

It is a pragmatic principle[2]of customary international law that one State cannot be subjected to proceedings by the court of another State. This principle, known as State immunity, encompasses both jurisdiction and enforcement and, as a corollary of the sovereign equality of States, is part of the warp and weft of the contemporary international politico-legal order.[3]

State immunity has been divided into jurisdictional immunity (or immunity from suit) and enforcement immunity. Jurisdictional immunity precludes the adjudication of a claim brought against the foreign State, while immunity from enforcement precludes the recognition of a foreign judgement or arbitral award for the purposes of issuing an order or injunction to enforce this against a foreign State. Another distinction is between personaland propertyimmunities. The Sapin 2 law addresses State immunity in respect of enforcementand as against property.

Whereas the principleof State immunity is derived from international law, the lawof State immunity is given force by the provisions of instruments of national laws of States[4]. Predictably, different States understand and approach State immunity in different ways[5]. Two doctrines exist: the absolute doctrine and the restrictive doctrine.

The absolute doctrine holds that State immunity applies to a foreign State under all circumstances, save for by express waiver. The restrictive doctrine recognises a distinction between public and private acts. Immunity only applies to the former. The prevailing trend[6], is towards the restrictive approach, whereby immunity remains the “default rule… subject to a number of stated exceptions.”[7]

Accompanying the entry of States into the commercial world has been a broad adoption of the restrictive approach to State immunity. This allows commercial parties to enforce their rights against States where States are essentially commercial actors.[8]

Enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards is a sensitive area for all jurisdictions: each instance brings with it the renewed threat of a political squall. Before the Sapin 2 law, France had gained a reputation as a pro-enforcement jurisdiction, as will be explored with the aid of a few well-known examples in the next section. It is safe to assume that the legislator had such political fracases in mind in the drafting of the Sapin 2 law. 

One factor which commits States to continue the trend towards the restrictive approach, is the almost universally adopted the New York Convention[9]: States which are party to the New York Convention have signed up to an obligation to recognise and enforce valid[10]foreign arbitral awards,[11]subject to an ordre publicexception[12]. Despite this clear premise, in practice, the enforcement of an arbitral award against a State can be, “the most difficult, lengthy, and expensive phase of an investor-state arbitration”[13]if a State attempts to prevent such enforcement. 

The 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (hereafter, “the 2004 UN Convention”)[14]has a “second life” under the municipal laws of Russia and France: both the Russian law on Jurisdictional Immunities of a Foreign State and Property of a Foreign State, and the French Sapin 2 lawdraw on the 2004 United Nations Convention for at least some of their provisions. Both laws (French and Russian) were promulgated soon after the issuance of the French exequatur order in the Yukos Saga[15], and the slew of attachment orders which remained in place during the appeal process. 

So then, against a tumultuous political backdrop, the passage of the Sapin 2 law was surely intended to signal a sea-change for France: an opportunity to rehabilitate its diplomatic image and to promulgate a new, better-balanced, more certain framework for enforcement proceedings.

The rules governing State immunity must be flexibleenough to give effect to State immunity (else risk the opprobrium of the international community), yet clearenough to allow both the foreign State and the private party seeking enforcement to know in advance what assets are protected under what circumstances. This balance between flexibility and certainty is desirable in the drafting of any rule. This is, all the more, important in the present context of enforcement against a foreign State, where we observe the judge forced to navigate the narrow straits between the rule of law and international politics. To avoid shipwreck in such treacherous waters, procedure must be robust, and must be applied rigorously. The French Sapin 2 law certainly recognises these exigencies. Does it, however, deliver the effective solutions needed? 

The old regime for imposing measures of constraint on sovereign assets

In the last decade, France has become one of the major playgrounds for the recovery of sovereign assets. Two distinctive factors explain this pattern: a lenient interpretation of rules on sovereign immunity by French courts on the one hand, and a permissive regime for the recognition and enforcementof international arbitral awards on the other.

Paris is notorious for being an “arbitration-friendly” jurisdiction. The recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is fully in step with the Article 5 of the New York Convention.[16]Furthermore, according to the Hilmarton[17]and Putrabali[18]cases, French courts promote the recognition and allow the enforcement of international awards that have been set aside in their country of origin.[19]

In the Hilmartoncase, for example, the dispute arose between a French corporation OTV and an English company over the payment of a commission for securing a contract in Algeria. The sole arbitrator seated in Geneva held that the commission was not due under Algerian law. In fact, Algerian law, governing the contract prohibited payments to intermediaries.[20]OTV applied for enforcement in France and Hilmarton filed an application to set aside the award in Geneva.

Under these conditions, the French judge had to contend with two conflicting outcomes and focus on the prospect of recognising in France an award which had been set aside in its country of origin. How is a judge to reconcile two such contradictory rulings? At the appeal stage, the Paris Court held that “the judge may not refuse to enforce unless the national law so authorises”. The court observed that Article 1502 of the Civil Procedure Code does not include as one of the grounds for refusal to enforce the award, the fact that it has been set aside in its country of origin and that it wouldn’t contradict the French conception of international public policy.[21]

The French Cour de Cassationendorsed this reasoning and stated that “[the] existence [of the international award]continued in spite of its being set aside and that its recognition in France was not contrary to international public policy.”[22]The Hilmartonprinciple was further refined and rigorously applied in the 2007 Putrabalicase, further buttressing the image of France as the venue of choice for enforcing awards under fraught conditions.

Until 2016, French legislation on sovereign immunities and measures of constraint imposed on State assets left much to be desired. According to commentators, international conventions aside, France had no comprehensive set of statutory rules governing sovereign enforcement immunity.[23]Only two articles, namely Article L.153-1.1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code[24]and Article L.111-1 of the French Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures[25]would explicitly grant such protection to the sovereigns against pre-judgement and post-judgement measures of constraint. France has left the task of developing the relevant rules to domestic judges.[26]In line with prevailing trends worldwide, the early cases considered enforcement immunity as being absolute, unless under exceptional circumstances, or by explicit waiver.[27]

One of the major questions that the French judges dealt with was whether the incorporation of an arbitration agreement could be regarded as a waiver of enforcement immunity in its own justifying measures of constraint imposed on State assets.

In the Creightoncase[28], the French Cour de Cassationestablished that by the conclusion of an arbitration agreement, the State does expressly waive its immunity from measures of constraint. Notably, this decision seems to be in line with the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States.[29]Under Articles 18[30](State immunity from pre-judgment measures of constraint) and 19[31](State immunity from post-judgment measures of constraint), the existence of an arbitration agreement is accorded the status of express consent to waive enforcement immunities in respect of arbitral awards arising therefrom.

In the 2013 NML Capital[32]case, the dispute arose between an investment fund and Argentina following its default on sovereign bonds due to the financial crisis. The investment fund won the litigation in the United States and sought enforcement before French courts. NML imposed attachments on oil receivables. The French Cour de Cassationfound that the Argentine assets were protected by enforcement immunity. In fact, to overcome the State’s enforcement immunity, it was held that the sovereign needed to make an expressand specialwaiver on its assets. This decision has been the subject of vigorous criticism by commentators, some of whom see this as a patent example of a political approach to State immunity by the French courts, not founded in hard law and procedure, and best explained by a desire to insulate Argentina from being affected by the so-called vulture funds.[33]

Later in 2015 Commisimpexcase[34], the French Cour de cassationdeparted from the NMLjurisprudence by abandoning the double requirement of an expressand specialwaiver on State’s assets. In this case, the dispute arose out of unpaid public works carried out by Comissimpex in Congo. The company sought enforcement of an ICC award in France and made attachments on accounts belonging to the Congolese diplomatic mission and its UNESCO delegation. The Paris Court of Appeal lifted the attachments by requiring an expressand specialwaiver. The French Cour de cassationhowever quashed the decision and only required an express waiver.

Needless to say, judicial measures of constraint imposed on a State’s assets may have a heavy political impact.[35]Yukosenforcement proceedings have cooled French diplomatic relations with Russia. Following several attempts to seize Russian assets, Russia has enacted a new law largely based on the 2004 UN Convention, but also containing a section on reciprocity: “[t]he law envisages the possibility for a Russian Federation court to limit the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign State if it finds that the State in question offers the Russian Federation limited jurisdictional immunity.”[36]

Against this background, France has put in place a new regulatory framework with a robust dispositifconcerning sovereign enforcement immunities and the conditions under which measures of constraint can be exercised against State’s assets. How far does it go in remedying the problem?

 

The new enforcement system under the Sapin 2 Law

On 9 December 2016, the Sapin 2 law was issued, in order to, inter alia, amend the rules governing enforcement, provisional measures, and State immunity in France. The entry into force of the Sapin 2 law on 1 June 2017 has brought French legislation into line with the international standard, as set down in the 2004 UN Convention, by Article 59 of law which introduced three new articles into the French Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures[37](“the Code”).

These new provisions bring an important change to French law, both from a substantive and a procedural point of view, as they clearly aim to discourage measures of constraint against State assets located in France.

a.     The substantive changes

The new Article L. 111-1-2 of the Code sets out three alternative scenarios in which State assets located in France can be subjected to provisional or enforcement measures: 

  1. “If the State has expressly consented to the application of such a measure; 
  2. If the State concerned has reserved or affected the property to the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of the proceedings; 
  3. Where a foreign judgment or arbitral award has been issued against the State and the property in question is specifically used – or intended for use – by that State otherwise than for the purposes of public service and is linked to the entity against which the proceedings are initiated.”

 

In short, the new criteria set out by this provision distinguish between assets depending on whether they have been assigned to public (sovereign), or to commercial activities. Such assignment is express in the first and second of these limbs. 

Furthermore, the first two paragraphs of this Article 59 mirror Article 18 of the 2004 UN Convention[38]as far as pre-judgment measures are concerned, and paragraphs a) and b) of Article 19 of the same Convention[39]which tackles post-judgment measures. These provisions should be taken into account when negotiating State immunity waiver clauses, since the specific assignment of a State asset to the satisfaction of a claim (as provided by Article L. 111-1-2, 2° of the Code) could go some way to guaranteeing certainty as to future enforcement.

The third limb matches paragraph c) of Article 19 of the 2004 UN Convention[40]concerning the specific case of post-judgment measures affecting State assets allocated to non‑commercial purposes. 

Importantly, the Sapin 2 law goes a step further than the Convention in listing examples of assets that should be considered as “specifically used or intended for use by the State for public service purposes”. These include diplomatic property (such as bank accounts), military property, cultural heritage of the State, property that is part of a scientific, cultural or historical exhibition, as well as tax or social revenues of the State. 

The French legislator was also careful to set out specific rules for the attachment of diplomatic property. The new article L. 111‑1‑3 of the Code requires a State’s waiver of immunity over property related to diplomatic activities to be both expressand special.[41]This accords recognition of the special status of diplomatic activities as being at the heart of sovereign activity, justifying the more stringent standard for a waiver of such immunity. A recent decision from the French Cour de Cassationhad only required the waiver to be express.[42]Under the Sapin 2 regime, this is no longer sufficient: the new standard is more stringent.

b.   The procedural changes

As far as procedural innovation is concerned, the Sapin 2 law goes further than the 2004 UN Convention by introducing a new authorisation mechanism[43]. Pursuant to the new article L. 111-1-1 of the Code, prior authorisation of the court is now required for all provisional or enforcement measures against property of a foreign State located in France. Although this mechanism does not exist in the 2004 UN Convention, France is not the only forum requiring prior court authorisation, as Belgium introduced a similar mechanism in 2015.[44]

This prior request may be sought ex partein a procedure sur requête. Because this procedure is ex parte(i.e. non-adversarial), Article L. 111-1-1 of the Code gives the creditor a strategic advantage, as the debtor State will not be given notice of the measure of constraint at the time the creditor introduces its motion. The element of surprise granted by this procedure prevents the concealment of property, a risk commonly associated with enforcement. This might appear (in its specific and limited scope of application) to see practicality trumping the rule of law. However, subsequent procedural steps allow the foreign State some recourse, compensating this initial imbalance.

The process becomes adversarial once the order is issued, whether it grants the measure or not. First, if the order grants the attachment, the debtor State can form a circular appeal asking the same judge who issued the order to withdraw it. Secondly, if the order denies the request, the creditor seeking enforcement can form an appeal, which will be adversarial.[45]

At first glance, the prior authorisation procedure does not have a revolutionary effect as it merely establishes a filtering system by contributing an additional step in enforcement proceedings. In practice, though, this mechanism could make it rather difficult for creditors to obtain provisional or enforcement measures against State assets located in France. The bottleneck will most often be the evidentiary burden placed on the party seeking the order. 

Before the Sapin 2 law, a creditor was able to obtain an attachment order, and then set about proving the legality of this order. This, as events proved, was a rather blunt instrument to solve the problem outlined above. The procedure has been rebalanced: placed in the same situation, the same creditor must now prove that the property is suitable for seizure beforebeing authorised by the judge to place it under a measure of constraint. 

By placing this burden of proof on the creditor at an earlier stage of the proceedings, the Sapin 2 law requires that the creditor prove that the property exists, and that it is suitable for seizure. As mentioned before, the criterion set out by the new article L. 111-1-2 of the Code mostly relies on the distinction between public or commercial property. While the distinction seems clear cut in theory, in practice, this holds the potential of becoming a fiercely disputed point between the parties. After all, such assets rarely come labelled and fall under one or other category: One can imagine how difficult it will be to prove, in advance, that money held in a bank account would be allocated to a commercial activity, and thus suitable for measures of constraint. 

Against this background, what is the true effect of introducing this additional step in already lengthy enforcement proceedings? Has this made a positive contribution to legal certainty, or has the French legislator chosen to show deference to the principle of State immunity, and left the commercial parties to foot the bill for this truncation of procedure? 

The answers to these questions are yet to be determined definitively while the reform is relatively new, and in the absence of rigorous application. Questions about the effectiveness of the changes to French enforcement immunity brought about by Sapin 2 remain open. While comment and punditry are sure to continue as to the actual effect of the Sapin 2 law, it is clear that the reforms intend to plug the holes exposed by the Yukosenforcement Saga. They set the tiller towards a more comprehensive framework for such enforcement proceedings. 

Yukos shareholders have made significant efforts to enforce the $50 billion award against Russia all over the world. Since 2014, France has grown in importance as a venue for the enforcement of the awards. At the time of writing, proceedings are still on-going.[46]On 12 May 2017 a hearing was held at Paris Court of Appeal with respect to the six freezing orders applied to the payments due by Eutelsat to the Russian Satellite Communications Company, and by VTB Bank (France) to RIA Novosti obtained by Yukos shareholders against Russian Federation.[47]The freezing orders were made before the entry into force of the Sapin 2 law. Yet it remains to be seen whether the reforms of the Sapin 2 law will have a discernible impact on the reasoning of the Paris Court of Appeal, in its hotly anticipated decision.

Anastasia Medvedskaya, qualified lawyer at the Paris Bar,

Paul-Raphael Shehadeh, BA in jurisprudence, Oxford


[1]Loi n° 2016-1691 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique, 9 December 2016.


[2]J. Finke, “Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else? The European Journal of International Law”, Vol 21, no. 4, 2001, p. 880.


[3]Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Judgment of 3 February 2012, at paragraph 57: “State immunity occupies an important place in international law and international relations. It derives from the principle of sovereign equality of States, which… is one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order”.


[4]At the time of writing, the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property is two signatures short of the thirty required for entry into force (as set out in article 30 of the Convention). Even in this state, the Convention has made an important contribution to clarifying the law in this area. Furthermore, it has served as a convenient model for many countries seeking to reform their laws, and will only grow in importance as this area of law develops further. We will draw direct links between the provisions of the Convention and the Sapin 2 law throughout. The 1976 European Convention on State Immunities (or the “Basel Treaty”) also made an important contribution to developing consensus as to the direction of travel of this area of law, though only ratified by eight States.


[5]The heterodoxy which results from this begs the question whether the principle has crystalized into a settled rule. For a discussion of one of the many unsettled areas of the international lawof State immunity, see A. Dickinson, “State Immunity and State-Owned Enterprises”, Business Law International, Issue 10(2), at p. 97.


[6]This is reflected in the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (1976), the English State Immunity Act (1978), the 2004 UN Convention, the Russian law on Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States (2015), as well as in the Sapin 2 law (2016). A notable exception to this trend is Hong Kong. Here, the UK’s SIA, used to apply by means of the State Immunity (Overseas Territories) Order 1979, giving effect to the restrictive doctrine. Since 1 July 1997, Hong Kong has been a special administrative region of China, Hong Kong and by virtue of this, it nowadopts the absolute approach, in application of the Chinese Basic Law (article 158(3)). This was settled in Democratic Republic of the Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates[2011] HKCFA 41 (See discussion in paragraphs 225-231).


[7]Males, LJ, General Dynamics UK Ltd v Libya, [2019] EWHC 64 (Comm), at paragraph 12.


[8]See Denning J, Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of NigeriaCourt of Appeal (Civil Division), [1977] Q.B. 529, at p.555: “In the last 50 years there has been a complete transformation in the functions of a sovereign state. Nearly every country now engages in commercial activities. It has its departments of state - or creates its own legal entities - which go into the market places of the world... This transformation has changed the rules of international law relating to sovereign immunity”.


[9]Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 June 1958. 


[10]New York Convention, Article V(1), V(2)(a).


[11]New York Convention, Articles III, V.


[12]New York Convention, Article V(2)(b).


[13]F. Dugan, Christopher; D. Wallace; N. Rubins, B. Sabahi, “Enforcement of Awards”, in Investor-State Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2008, p.700.


[14]United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 2 December 2004, Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Ninth Session, Supplement No. 49(A/59/49).


[15]See descriptions of the attempted seizures against Russian Federation by the Yukos shareholders: https://www.yukoscase.com/court-actions/attempted-asset-seizures/(last consulted on 18 March 2019).


[16]Article 1520 of the French Civil Procedure Code.


[17]French Cassation Court, 1stCivil Chamber, 23 March 1994, no. 92-15137.


[18]French Cassation Court, 1stCivil Chamber, 29 June 2007, no. 05-18.053.


[19]E. Gaillard, “Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin: The French Experience”, Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the New York Convention, 1999, pp. 505-527.


[20]ICC Award No. 5622, Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1993, p. 327; A. J. van den Berg, ed., ICCA Yearbook Commercial Arbitration XIX, 1994, p. 105.


[21]E. Gaillard, “Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin: The French Experience”, Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the New York Convention, 1999, pp. 505-527.


[22]French Cassation Court, 1stCivil Chamber, 23 March 1994, no. 92-15137.


[23]F. Malet-Deraedt, “The New French Legislation on State Immunities from Enforcement”, ASA Bulletin, 2018, pp. 332-333.


[24]Assets held by foreign central banks or foreign monetary authorities or managed for their own account or on behalf of foreign States cannot be seized to the exception that these were used for a commercial activity.


[25]According to this article, judicial enforcement and provisional measures are prohibited against public entities benefiting from immunity to the exception that the entity had acted de jure gestionisor when it had explicitly waived the benefit of immunity.


[26]A. Atallah, “The Arbitration Clause and State Immunity under French Law”, BCDR International Arbitration Review, Kluwer, 2015, pp. 389 – 408.


[27]Poitiers Court of Appeal, 20 December 1937, Sté Cementos Resola v. Larrasquitu et État espagnol, Journal du Droit International 1938, p. 288.


[28]French Cassation Court, 1stCivil Chamber, Petition No. 98-19068, Judgment, 6 July 2000.


[29]United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 2 December 2004, Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Ninth Session, Supplement No. 49(A/59/49).


[30]The UN Convention, Article 18 “No pre-judgment measures of constraint, such as attachment or arrest, against property of a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State unless and except to the extent that (a) the State has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated: […] (ii) by an arbitration agreement”.


[31]The UN Convention, Article 19 “No post-judgement measures of constraint, such as attachment or arrest, against property of a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State unless and except to the extent that (a) the State has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated: […] (ii) by an arbitration agreement”.


[32]French Cassation Court, 1st Civil Chamber, Petition No.10-25.938, Judgement, 28 mars 2013.


[33]H. Muir Watt, “De la renonciation à l'immunité de juridiction des Etat”, Revue critique de droit international privé, 2013, p. 671.


[34]French Cassation Court, 1stCivil Chamber, Petition No. 13-17751, Judgment 13 May 2015.


[35]F. Malet-Deraedt, “The New French Legislation on State Immunities from Enforcement”, ASA Bulletin, 2018, pp. 333. See excerpts from the discussion in Parliament of the Bill, Assemblée Nationale, Report no. 3785 of 26 May 2016, pp. 276-277.


[36]Law on jurisdictional immunities of a foreign state and its property in Russia, 4 November 2015, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/50624(last consulted on 18 March 2019).


[37]Art. L.111-1-1 to L. 111-1-3 of the French Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures.


[38]Art. 18 – State immunity from pre-judgment measures of constraint:

“No pre-judgment measures of constraint, such as attachment or arrest, against property of a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State unless and except to the extent that:

(a) the State has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated; (i) by international agreement; (ii) by an arbitration agreement or in a written contract; or (iii) by a declaration before the court or by a written communication after a dispute between the parties has arisen; or

(b) the State has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of that proceeding.”


[39]Article 19 – State immunity from post-judgment measures of constraint

“No post-judgment measures of constraints, such as attachment, arrest or execution, against property of a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State unless and except to the extent that: 

(a) The State has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated: (i) by international agreement; (ii) by an arbitration agreement or in a written contract; or (iii) by a declaration before the court or by a written communication after a dispute between the parties has arisen; or 

(b) The State has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of that proceeding; […]”


[40]“[…] (c) it has been established that the property is specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes and is in the territory of the State of the forum, provided that post-judgment measures of constraints may only be taken against property that has a connection with the entity against which the proceeding was directed.”


[41]Compare this with the language selected by the Court in French Cassation Court, 1st Civil Chamber, Petition No.10-25.938, Judgement, 28 mars 2013 discussed above.


[42]French Cassation Court, 1st Civil Chamber, Petition n° 13-17.751, Judgement, 13 May 2015.


[43]For a more detailed review of this mechanism: C. Boulanger, “La consecration de l’autorisation préalable à la saisie en France des biens d’un État étranger”, RDIA, 2019, n°1 p. 257 et seq.


[44]Article 1412quinquies of the Belgian Judicial Code, introduced by the 23 August 2015 law. 


[45]Article R. 111-6 of the Code. 


[46]See descriptions of the attempted seizures against Russian Federation by the Yukos shareholders: https://www.yukoscase.com/court-actions/attempted-asset-seizures/(last consulted on 18 March 2019).


[47]See descriptions of the attempted seizures against Russian Federation by the Yukos shareholders: https://www.yukoscase.com/court-actions/attempted-asset-seizures/(last consulted on 18 March 2019).